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THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
REGULATORY OFFENCES: IS THERE AN
ECONOMIC CASE FOR INTEGRATION?*
NUNO GAROUPA**, ANTHONY OGUS*** AND ANDREW SANDERS****
I. INTRODUCTION
In relation to criminal justice, there is a long-standing assumption,
based primarily on the separation of powers doctrine, that law-making,
investigation and determination of liability should be undertaken by
different institutions. The separation of investigation and prosecution
is a more recent phenomenon, although apparently inspired by similar
ideas.1 The approach to institutional design in regulatory law has been
significantly different, since in general regulatory agencies exercise not
only investigatory and prosecuting powers, but they are also involved,
to some extent, in rule-making and adjudication. Indeed, current
legislative developments in the UK are taking the process of integration
even further, enabling regulatory agencies themselves in many sectors
to impose financial sanctions for certain types of contravention (as in
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, discussed later).2
The reasons for different arrangements in the criminal justice and
regulatory spheres are not obvious, given in particular that the criminal
justice system plays an important part in regulatory enforcement.3
* We are grateful to two anonymous referees and the editor, John Bell. Roya H. Samarghandi has
provided excellent research assistance. Garoupa acknowledges financial support by FCT,
PPCDT/JUR/55752/2006. The usual disclaimers apply.
** University of Illinois.
*** University of Manchester and Erasmus University of Rotterdam.
**** University of Birmingham.
1 For the sake of exposition, we assume the duality of the two functions of investigation and
prosecution. We recognize that it is difficult to make a pure separation between investigation and
prosecution because investigators are sometimes involved in prosecution decisions while
prosecutors are sometimes involved in investigation. In fact, as we explain later, in most systems
there is a continuum of arrangements from full separation to full integration. In addition, we refer
to “criminal justice” as a short-hand for police-initiated processes. We recognise that in the UK
many “regulatory” bodies (e.g. the HSE) sometimes prosecute in the criminal courts and that the
full range of criminal sanctions then become available.
2 This is already the case in many civil law jurisdictions. Note the police also have similar sanctions,
on a more modest scale (see later).
3 Again for the purpose of exposition, we assume that there is a clear distinction between
“regulatory” crimes and “mainstream” crimes, but the qualitative conclusions still hold in the
more realistic context of a convoluted and debatable distinction. See, for example, G. Lamond,
“What is a Crime?” (2007) 27 O.J.L.S. 609 and A. Ogus, “Regulation and its Relationship with the
Criminal Justice Process” in H. Quirk, T. Seddon and G. Smith (eds.), Regulation and Criminal
Justice: Innovations in Policy and Research (Cambridge 2010) for advocates, and S. Tombs and
D. Whyte “A Crisis of Enforcement: the Decriminalisation of Death and Injury at Work” (2008)
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Do the virtues of separation vary simply according to the moral con-
tent of the law? Are they outweighed by considerations of adminis-
trative convenience in the regulatory sphere? Is accountability more
problematic for the police, the main enforcement agent for “main-
stream” criminal law, than for regulatory agencies? Can we provide an
economic explanation for these differences?
The use of economic analysis in understanding law is by now well
established notwithstanding the standard critique of the rational
model.4 There is also a vast literature on criminal law and economics.5
It is therefore timely to assess, from an economic perspective, the
extent to which investigation and prosecution should be separated.
Economics has developed appropriate techniques to assess if a particular
(legal) policy is cost-effective. It seems only natural we apply such
methodology to understand the advantages and the disadvantages, the
benefits and the costs, of particular institutional arrangements.
In this paper, we focus on the relationship between investigation
and prosecution. In this context, there is a sharp difference between the
regulatory and criminal justice approaches. We offer economic ex-
planations for the differences. We begin with an historical account of
the approaches taken in the criminal justice and regulatory spheres,
primarily in England and Wales. The focus is on the non-economic
arguments underpinning these approaches as, historically, these argu-
ments were mostly not economic in nature. We then develop an econ-
omic framework and apply it successively to the criminal justice and
regulatory processes.
II. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
“MAINSTREAM” CRIME IN ENGLAND AND WALES
A. Historical Background
1. Before the police
Before the introduction of professional police forces in the early-mid
19th century, there was no formal separation between investigation and
prosecution, and little separation in practice: criminal investigation was
the responsibility of the victim in most cases, as was the instigation and
conduct of prosecutions.6 This is, at first sight, puzzling, as all parishes
(Centre for Crime and Justice Studies Briefing no 6, Kings College London) and A. Sanders
“Reconciling the apparently different goals of criminal justice and regulation: the ‘freedom’
perspective” in H. Quirk et al., op.cit. for opponents, of these distinctions.
4 See, for example, A. Ogus, Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for the Law (Oxford
2006).
5 See N. Garoupa (ed.), Criminal Law and Economics (Aldershot 2009).
6 In the second half of the 18th century in Staffordshire, for example, only 13% of the prosecutions
were brought by anyone in public office: D. Hay and F. Snyder (eds.), Policing and Prosecution in
Britain, 1750–1850 (Oxford 1989).
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had to appoint constables. But in most towns and rural areas the
office of constable was an unpaid chore that rotated around eligible
parishioners. Constables sometimes arrested suspected offenders when
victims asked them to do so, but they rarely investigated themselves,
nor was it usual for them to prosecute.7
Even the semi-professional police forces which operated in several
urban areas in the early 19th century did little to effect prosecutions
which were, in consequence, rare.8 This was a matter of concern for the
state, which increasingly sought to encourage victims to prosecute
through reimbursement of expenses and rewards, mainly in relation
to property offences.9 But this was of limited effectiveness,10 partly
because prosecution often remained a financial risk11 and partly
because local sympathies were often divided between criminals and
their victims, and so if the latter prosecuted they sometimes risked
reprisals.12
2. The police
The main functions of the professional police after their introduction in
England and Wales in the early-mid 19th century were order mainten-
ance and crime prevention. But it seems to have been accepted from
very early on that their achievement required effective prosecution ar-
rangements. Thus in 1838, less than 10 years after the Metropolitan
Police were created, a Parliamentary Select Committee referred to the
police as “qualified to act as prosecutors … a duty which is now very
generally and beneficially devolved upon them …”.13
In reality large numbers of cases – even murders – went unin-
vestigated and/or unprosecuted for many more years.14 Though as the
19th century wore on the police increasingly seemed to regard them-
selves as suitable for filling the gap between victims and the courts, it is
not clear by what mechanism or ideology this happened.15 All we know
is that it was a gradual process. The argument that the police should
take prosecutions over from victims in all cases had not been accepted
7 D. Philips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England (London 1977), ch. 4; J. King, Crime, Justice
and Discretion in England, 1740–1820 (Oxford 2000), p. 75.
8 For example, many thieves in Essex sold stolen goods in London at that time. But the London-
based Bow Street Runners charged Essex victims for their services if they became involved: the
usual rule was “parties must pay” (L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its
Administration, vol. 2: The Movement for Reform (London 1956), p. 263).
9 King (2000), note 7 above, ch. 2 and 3.
10 C. Emsley, Crime and Society in England, 1750–1900, 2nd ed. (Longman 1996), ch. 8.
11 As indicated by the fact that by the end of the 18th century the majority of prosecutors were still
not legally represented:J. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660–1800 (Oxford 1986).
12 D. Hay, “Controlling the English Prosecutor” (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 165–186.
13 Quoted by L. Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and its Administration, vol. 4:
Grappling for Control (London 1968), p. 196.
14 Hay and Snyder, note 6 above; Phillips, note 7 above, p. 114.
15 Emsley, note 10 above, ch. 8.
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even by the 1920s.16 They were not given any specific prosecution
powers in the 19th century, and still have not been; nor are they under
any legislative duty to investigate alleged crimes or to prosecute.17
3. Calls for public prosecutors
Shortly after the police were established, calls began to be heard for
independent public prosecutors – by, for example, Royal Commissions
and a Parliamentary Select Committee 1845, 1855 and 1875.18 There
was a combination of reasons for this. First, the onus on victims to
prosecute was an unfair burden. Secondly, while police powers (e.g. to
arrest) were increasing, the courts were losing their supervisory juris-
diction over law enforcement officials, particularly over whether or not
to prosecute. Thirdly, even if prosecution decisions were generally be-
ing made in good faith, policy could still vary greatly from locality to
locality, from individual to individual and from offence to offence.
Finally, there was criticism of the competence of police prosecutors: it
was said that large numbers of criminals were going unpunished.
The principal argument against a public prosecution service was its
cost; but there was also the same fear of creating excessive executive
power that had obstructed the creation of a national police force
(and, indeed, any publicly organised police forces) for many years. This
reflected a tradition that celebrated the humbling of authoritarian
monarchies. Thus anything that would increase the power of the
executive, even at the indirect expense of the courts and of Parliament,
was resisted.19
Linked to the argument against increasing executive power was the
desire to preserve the right of direct access to the criminal courts for
private citizens. Private prosecution, it was often said at the time,
would be more difficult or impossible if there was a body charged with
the public duty to prosecute. While it might be thought that private
prosecutors could use the law oppressively, prosecutions could only
proceed if permitted by the “grand jury”. In the 18th century this pro-
tection seems to have worked reasonably well, as grand juries at that
time threw out around 25% of cases.20
Eventually, a compromise solution was reached. The office of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) was created in 1879. This was a
small, and therefore inexpensive, organisation which remained the only
public prosecution service, in relation to police-enforced crime, for over
16 A. Bodkin, “Prosecution of Offenders: English Practice” (1928) 1 Police Journal 353.
17 However, a refusal or failure to investigate can be held to beWednesbury-unreasonable or a breach
of a tortious duty under common law. See A. Sanders, R. Young and M. Burton, Criminal Justice
(Oxford 2010), chs. 7, 13.
18 S. Uglow, “Independent Prosecutions” (1984) 11 Journal of Law and Society 233–245.
19 Hay, note 12 above.
20 Ibid.
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100 years. It dealt with very few cases. By 1981 it still consisted of only
around 70 lawyers plus support staff, and most of its work concerned
policy and cases where police officers were the suspects.21 The rights of
private prosecution were preserved, though in 1908 the DPP was given
the power to take over, and then (if the DPP wished) drop, private
prosecutions. However, this power is very rarely exercised.
4. The Crown Prosecution Service
At various times in the 19th century there were experiments with dif-
ferent prosecution arrangements, usually involving local lawyers
undertaking the more serious cases. By the mid-20th century there were
prosecuting solicitors’ departments (employed by police authorities,
local authorities or, more rarely, by the police themselves) in all large
cities and some rural areas. And, where there were no prosecuting
solicitors’ departments, local solicitors and barristers were nonetheless
instructed on a case-by-case basis in serious and complex cases.
But even in London in the 1970s, where prosecuting solicitors were
employed directly by the Metropolitan Police, police officers still pro-
secuted large numbers of cases in magistrates’ courts.22
Prosecuting solicitors were used in different ways by their police
forces. In many areas, there was a traditional solicitor-client relation-
ship: the police used them almost exclusively as court advocates, to
prosecute cases that the police wanted prosecuted, and with very
little discretion to drop or reduce charges. In other areas, the police
sought their advice in most cases where there was a prima facie case,
and they generally followed that advice; this gave lawyers effective
control over decisions in large numbers of non-prosecutions as well as
prosecutions.23 This latter approach was the one favoured by the Royal
Commission on Criminal Procedure,24 and formed the basis for the
establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in 1985.
The CPS was established as a national service with the DPP as its
Head. Prosecutors in each CPS area are under the direction of a Chief
Crown Prosecutor. The head office deals with a small number of very
serious and sensitive cases and various policy issues that are not the
concern of this paper. The CPS was initially given the right to prosecute
all cases, and the power to drop any of those cases it wished. But the
21 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, The Investigation and Prosecution of Criminal Offences
in England and Wales: The Law and Procedure (HMSO 1981), para. 155–164.
22 For a survey see M. Weatheritt, Survey of Prosecuting Solicitors’ Departments (RCCP Research
Study no. 11) (HMSO 1980); for general discussion see J. Sigler, “Public Prosecution in England
and Wales” (1974) Criminal Law Review 642.
23 A. Sanders, “Prosecution Decisions and the Attorney-General’s Guidelines” (1985) Criminal Law
Review 4.
24 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Report of the Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure (HMSO 1981).
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power to charge (i.e. to initiate proceedings) remained with the police,
as did the power not to do so. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003
finally transferred the power to charge from the police to the CPS,
though the police retain the right not to prosecute in most cases
(see later).
B. The Legal and Constitutional Arguments for Separation of
Investigation and Prosecution
By the mid 19th century the cost argument for separating investigation
and prosecution no longer operated but the other arguments could still
be invoked. Moreover, we should recall that in the 18th century there
was a form of separation in that prosecution was the responsibility of
the victim/police/prosecutor and of the grand jury. But grand juries,
who we have seen were at least partially effective in gatekeeping pro-
secutions in the 18th century, became ineffective, so that by the late 19th
century they were rejecting only 4% of cases.25 Whatever the reasons for
this, the arguments for separation in this period were effectively dis-
cussions about who or what should undertake the function of the grand
jury.
The modern arguments for separation can be summarised under
three heads. The first involves abuse of power. There is broad agree-
ment in the literature on police discretion that prosecution policy is
used, to a greater or lesser extent, as an instrument of broader en-
forcement policy.26 This discretion might not in principle be problem-
atic under adversarial “opportunity” systems such as those adopted in
England and Wales. However the discretion can be abused if the policy
itself is corrupt or if corrupt, unlawful or oppressive means are used to
further an otherwise acceptable policy.
Widespread police corruption and malpractice were often alleged in
the 19th century. There were seen to be three main sources. First, the
increasing prevalence and scale of awards of costs to prosecutors in
successful cases made it financially advantageous to prosecute; and
created incentives to succeed at all, even unlawful, costs. Second, pro-
motion was based, in part, on successful prosecutions. Third, officers
could be bribed to overlook crime.27
Scandals continued throughout the 20th century. For example, vice
squad officers in London had been known to take bribes in exchange
for overlookingoffences of prostitution, obscene publications, gambling
and the like. There have also been cases of prosecutions of innocent
25 Hay, note 12 above.
26 Sanders, note 23 above.
27 P.B. Kurland and D.W.M. Waters, “Public Prosecutions in England 1854–9” (1959) 9 Duke Law
Journal 493.
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people aimed at covering up police misconduct through discrediting
complainants.28 And promotion and other benefits still accrue on the
back of large numbers of successful promotions. For example, police
forces have targets to achieve in “bringing offenders to justice”, and it
is now well documented that when these targets are in danger of being
missed, the police seek easy convictions, no matter how trivial the
offence or deserving the suspect, instead of pursuing cases of greater
priority.29
The use of wrongful means to further acceptable policies has been
dubbed “noble cause corruption” by a Met Police Commissioner. It
includes giving repeated “warnings” to offenders who would almost
certainly re-offend because those offenders would act as informers,
enabling the police to apprehend other criminals; and prosecuting
people against whom there are weak cases in order to deter them, or in
the hope of a guilty plea; sometimes the weaknesses are covered up by
fabrication or planting of evidence.30
The second and third heads, consistency and competence, do not
require much elaboration. The Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure noted hugely varying caution (warning) rates across differ-
ent police forces, although this would seem be an inevitable product of
a system of local policing. There are at least two problems relating to
competence. First, it connotes the ability to identify weaknesses
that should lead either to cases being dropped or to seek evidence to
strengthen them. Second, it arises in relation to the ability to present
cases in court. The police are not legally trained for this purpose. There
was evidence of large numbers of cases being dismissed at the end of the
prosecution case because the police were insisting on prosecution
without seeking the prior advice of prosecutors.31 For the Royal
Commission, this was an indication that investigators would necess-
arily be less dispassionate than those, especially lawyers, independent
of the investigating process.32
C. Degrees of Separation
The recommendations of the Royal Commission in 1981 that an inde-
pendent prosecution service be established for the reasons set out above
went largely unchallenged. However, the extent of separation in fact
adopted was somewhat limited and controversial. The Commission
recommended that the line dividing the functions should be drawn not,
as in many European jurisdictions, at the end of the investigation,
28 Sanders, Young and Burton, note 17 above, chs. 7, 12.
29 R. Flanagan, Review of Policing: Final Report (SO 2008).
30 See generally Sanders, Young and Burton, note 17 above, passim.
31 Royal Commission (1981), note 14 above.
32 Ibid., para. 6.29.
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leaving all prosecution decisions to independent prosecutors, but rather
after the police had decided whether or not to prosecute. Many
commentators argued that this would give the CPS too little power
over prosecutions, and empirical research has supported this criticism:
weak cases were still being prosecuted, inconsistency remained, and the
police still did as they wished in relation to warnings.33 Only in 2003 was
it eventually conceded that prosecutorial independence required the
initial power to prosecute. Even so, the police retain the right not to
prosecute (that is, to issue warnings or take no action at all). Although,
as before the establishment of the CPS, the police can, and often do,
consult prosecutors about difficult cases, they need not do so except in
the most serious cases. And they usually do not do so. The ratio of
prosecutions to formal warnings is around 5:1 in adult cases, and is
approximately equal in juvenile cases. The CPS sees very few of these
warned cases.34
We should note two curious counter-developments. In one, the
police have been given powers to dispose of relatively minor cases
themselves by issuing “penalty notices for disorder” (PNDs) under the
Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. These are used increasingly, and
for more serious matters than the motoring offences for which fixed
penalties have traditionally been used. Thus in 2006, over 100,000
PNDs were issued for “notifiable” (non-motoring) offences. PNDs
now constitute 7% of all detections, and the range of offences for
which PNDs can be issued has been extended far beyond public order
matters.35 But if PNDs are an example of the police regaining
lost power, the opposite has happened in relation to multi-million
pound frauds. In the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) accountants, police
officers and lawyers work together in teams, enabling investigation and
prosecution to be handled as seamlessly as possible. But unlike in
regulatory agencies (see later), lawyers – rather than investigators or
administrators – take the lead.36
The price for the increased formal power of the CPS is the deploy-
ment of some prosecutors in selected large police stations so that they
can authorise charges (or not) on the spot in order to minimise delay
and offer speedy advice. As a consequence, it may be difficult for pro-
secutors to resist cultural “capture” by the police. As with the SFO,
lawyers formally lead in respect of police prosecutions. But in other
respects CPS prosecutors are not in the position of SFO lawyers: they
still do not lead in respect of police investigations (unlike in many
33 Sanders, Young and Burton, note 17 above, ch. 7.
34 Ibid.
35 R. Young, “Street Policing after PACE” in E. Cape and R. Young (eds.), Regulating Policing
(Oxford 2008).
36 R.M. White, “Investigators and Prosecutors or, Desperately Seeking Scotland: Re-formulation of
the ‘Philips Principle’” (2006) 69 M.L.R. 143.
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jurisdictions, at least in serious cases, including Scotland); and many
prosecution decisions are taken on police territory and in accord with
timetables set by the police.
III. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF REGULATORY
OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES
A. Historical Background
Although the criminal justice system has always played a significant
role in regulatory enforcement, the arrangements for investigation and
prosecution have been markedly different from those for “mainstream”
crime. Admittedly, until the “administrative revolution” which oc-
curred in the middle of the 19th century in England and Wales, the
prosecution of regulatory offences, just like all other kinds of offence,
was a matter for individuals. The only officials with responsibility in
this respect were local justices of the peace. While the latter could be
stirred into action to deal with offences against property or the per-
son,37 their standing within the local community meant that they were
generally reluctant to prosecute local traders for regulatory offences,
for example those committed under the early Factories Acts.38
A new approach was taken in the 1833 Factories Act, the primary
concern of which was to overcome problems of enforcement.39 That
was perceived to require a central government agency with all-
embracing powers to make rules and standards, to initiate prosecutions
in local magistrates’ courts, and themselves to act as magistrates, thus
with power to impose fines and even imprisonment. In fact this latter
power proved to be over bold. Subsequent legislation in 1844 removed
the conferring of judicial authority on officers of the agency, but they
retained the power to prosecute, as well as to issue remedial orders
(which nevertheless required a court order if they failed to achieve
compliance).40
This system, inaugurated in 1844 for the Factory Inspectorate, with
powers to investigate contraventions, issue administrative orders and
prosecute criminal justice offences, but not themselves to impose
sanctions, became the standard pattern within England andWales for a
large variety of regulatory agencies, including those dealing with the
37 D. Hay, Albion’s Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (Harmondsworth
1977).
38 H. Arthurs, “Without the Law”: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth-Century
England (Toronto 1985).
39 Royal Commission on Practices and Proceedings of the Courts of Common Law, 5th Report
(1833–34).
40 P. Bartrip and P. Fenn, “The Administration of Safety: the Enforcement Policy of the Early
Factory Inspectorate, 1844-1864” (1980) 58 Public Administration 87.
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mines, the railways, public health, the Poor Law, and impure food.41
With some exceptions, the tradition is still maintained today: prosecu-
tions are undertaken by national agencies, such as the Health and
Safety Executive, the Environment Agency, and the Revenue and
Customs Prosecution Office42 but also by local authorities responsible
for public health and hygiene, housing, trading standards, food and
drugs, and child welfare.43 The 1981 Royal Commission, as we have
seen, played a key role in relation to mainstream crime, by recognising
as a general principle the importance of independent legal expertise
in the decision to prosecute and also the division of functions between
the police and prosecutor. Although it considered the question of
prosecution by non-police, and in particular regulatory, agencies
and commissioned a study of practices within this area,44 it did
not recommend any significant changes to the institutional arrange-
ments.45
B. Administrative Organisation and Prosecution
The extent to which, and the circumstances in which, resort is had to
prosecutions varies enormously across regulatory agencies and this is
reflected in the administrative structures within agencies. In most
agencies, there is a legal division which is responsible for assessing and
preparing the case for prosecution, and these lawyers may indeed be-
come involved in a case at an early stage in the enforcement process.46
But, in some, the investigating officers themselves prepare and pros-
ecute the case in the magistrates’ courts, whether or not they have legal
training.47 If a prosecution is undertaken in the Crown Court, a quali-
fied solicitor or barrister takes responsibility for appearing in court and
such a person may be from the agency’s legal division or else con-
tractually engaged for the purpose. In all these respects these arrange-
ments are very similar to the police arrangements prior to the 1981
Royal Commission that were described earlier.
There is evidence that legal officers within the organisation can
adopt a focus on a case different from that of investigating officers, or
at least investigating officers without legal training.48 The focus of the
legal officer tends to be on matters relating to what is required to secure
41 Arthurs, note 38 above.
42 This prosecutes for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC). See C. below.
43 B.M. Dickens, “Control of Prosecutions in the United Kingdom” (1973) 22 I.C.LQ. 1.
44 K.W. Lidstone, R. Hogg and F. Sutcliffe, “Prosecutions by Private Individuals and Non-Police
Agencies” (Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, Research Study 10, 1981).
45 See White, note 36 above.
46 Lidstone et al.), note 44 above.
47 K. Hawkins, Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-making in a Regulatory Agency (Oxford
2002).
48 J. Rowan-Robinson, P. Watchman and C. Barker, Crime and Regulation: A Study of the
Enforcement of Regulatory Codes (Edinburgh 1990); R. Kagan, Regulatory Justice (London 1978).
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a conviction, for example evidence, burden of proof and (where re-
quired)mens rea; the investigating officer tends to be more interested in
the characteristics of the offender of the particular contravention, and
whether a prosecution is deemed necessary to secure compliance.49
In order to illustrate many of these points, and points of difference,
it is instructive to consider an extended example. The Financial
Services Authority (FSA) was established in 1997 to regulate financial
markets and deal with financial crimes. It now works under the auth-
ority of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). It reg-
ulates banks, insurance companies, financial advisers, the mortgage
business (since 2004) and general insurance intermediaries (since 2005).
The Regulatory Decision Committee (RDC) of the FSA is responsible
for prosecution and adjudication of liability, and has oversight of
investigation by the enforcement teams.
Two cases illustrate some of the problems of this type of structure.
In the first case, life insurer Legal & General (L&G) was determined by
the FSA to have committed widespread mis-selling of with-profits en-
dowment mortgage polices between 1997 and 1999. The RDC fined
L&G £1.1m. On appeal, the Financial Services and Markets Tribunal
found that that the RDC had insufficient evidence of widespread mis-
selling, though it upheld part of the RDC’s determination, and so it
reduced the original penalty to £575,000. In the second case, the FSA
had investigated the roles of various city traders in the placing of a
spread bet. The FSA decided that they were guilty of market abuse
under the FSMA 2000 but chose to recommend fines rather than
prosecution. The RDC then imposed fines of £750,000 on one indi-
vidual and £100,000 on another. On appeal the Tribunal found that,
although there was evidence to support the claim that the spread bet
did take place, they were not guilty of non-disclosure, nor of market
abuse, because there had been no obligation to disclose in the appli-
cable regulations. The Tribunal subsequently stated that the FSA’s
decisions in these cases were unreasonable, stating that there was no
institution “independent of the enforcement division [of the FSA] to
assist the [Regulatory Decisions] Committee in its decision-making”.50
As a result, the FSA established an independent review of its en-
forcement and adjudication process in 2005. The subsequent “Strachan
Report”51 criticised the lack of transparency of the RDC and proposed
a reformed structure for the FSA with more significant external ac-
countability (for example, by giving accused people and firms a fairer
49 C. Abbot, Enforcing Pollution Control Regulation (Oxford 2009).
50 Details of both cases (the L&G case, and Paul Davidson & Ashley Tatham v the FSA, aka “the
Plumber” case) can be found on the FSA website: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/
Communication/PR/2005/082.shtml.
51 FSA, Enforcement Process Review (The “Strachan Report”) (2005). The report is available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/enf_process_review_report.pdf
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hearing). The review led to the creation of a Litigation and Legal
Review Unit within the enforcement division, hence promoting some
separation between investigation and prosecution. The unit is charged
with assessing cases before they are referred to the RDC, still the regu-
lator’s main sanctioning body. Other important recommendations
(there were 44 in total), included (i) the correspondence between the
RDC and the enforcement team should no longer be private, but
should be disclosed to the party under investigation; (ii) the enforce-
ment case team should no longer have direct access to the RDC after
the conclusion of a discussion meeting, without the representatives of
the organisation under investigation being present; (iii) any further
submissions to be made, either by the case team or the organisation
involved, would be disclosed to the other party; (iv) the RDC should be
removed from settlement negotiations; (v) the introduction of an ex-
plicit discount structure in the level of financial penalty that would
otherwise have been recommended by the RDC for organisations
which would settle early in the proceedings.52 In summary, the report
identified many of the disadvantages of an integrated structure of
investigation and prosecution, particularly in an organisation, like
the FSA, with powers to determine liability. The main consequence of
the report was a formal separation of investigation, enforcement and
determination of liability within the FSA itself.
C. The Policy Arguments for Integrating the Investigation and
Prosecution of Regulatory Offences
The justifications for integrating the investigation and prosecution of
regulatory offences do not seem to have been widely discussed, even
though, as we have seen, the arrangements have become different in
relation to mainstream crime. However, some arguments can be
gleaned from policy documents and other sources.
The 1981 Royal Commission devoted only a short passage to the
issue. The justifications for separation articulated in relation to
mainstream crime, control of abuse, consistency and competence, while
relevant to the regulatory context, were apparently outweighed by
other considerations. These were not fully articulated by the
Commission but seemed to have centred on resources, although there
was also an indication that within the regulatory sphere the functions
of investigation and prosecution were seen as not being easily separ-
able.
The study of prosecution by non-police agencies undertaken for
the Royal Commission was more expansive, though it should not be
taken as having been endorsed by the latter. The authors of the study
52 Ibid.
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suggested that the control of abuse and consistency arguments might
apply with greater force to the police, as contrasted with non-police
agencies.53 In particular, they doubted whether the “excessive zeal” of
the police in prosecuting had any real application to regulatory agen-
cies which were notoriously reluctant to prosecute, as is as evident
now54 as it was then. In addition, the technical aspects of regulatory
requirements and their complexity meant that the experience of
the investigating agency was of greater importance, particularly given
the broad discretion on whether prosecution was to be undertaken.
Prosecution by the police was considered to be more routine when the
threshold of sufficient evidence had been attained.
However, the justifications for integration have not been universally
accepted. The Robens Committee, whose Report had been instrumen-
tal in establishing the modern system of Health and Safety of Work
regulation, had adopted a different stance. They perceived there to be a
tension between an officer’s role in advising and educating regulatees
regarding their regulatory obligations and a prosecutorial role: if the
officer adopted both roles, this might inhibit the effectiveness of the
advice and education.55 It is noted too that the Australian Law Reform
Commission was happy to endorse the separation of investigation and
prosecution on the grounds that it helped to ensure consistency of
treatment across different areas of regulation,56 thus implying that
consistency outweighed other considerations. Further, we have seen in
relation to the FSA that the concerns within an integrated organisation
about “seepage” between investigation and prosecution (and indeed
adjudication) are as applicable to regulatory agencies as to criminal
justice agencies. And the in-house prosecutors employed by the main
tax collection and enforcement agency (Her Majesty’s Revenue and
Customs: HMRC) were so ineffective that a new prosecution agency
was established for the HMRC.57 The particular scandal that pre-
cipitated this was the failure to disclose participating informants who
were central to a high profile prosecution, the lawyers involved not
being powerful enough (vis-a`-vis the enforcement officers) to either
know about this or to disclose it.58
53 Lidstone et al., note 44 above.
54 See e.g. Abbot, note 49 above.
55 A. Robens, (1972) Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1970–1972 (HMSO
1972).
56 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Principled Regulation: Civil and Administrative
Penalties in Australian Federal Regulation (1995), paras. 6.26, 6.35.
57 The Revenue and Customs Prosecution Agency (RCPO). For details see White (2006), note 36
above. In January 2010 the RCPO became a Division of the CPS (see the CPS website for details).
58 M. Levi, “Policing Fraud and Organised Crime” in T. Newburn (ed.), Handbook of Policing
(Cullompton 2008).
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D. Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008
For many years the industry and business lobby has argued that regu-
lation imposes excessive burdens on enterprise. Government responded
by establishing units such as the “Better Regulation Executive” (now
part of the Government Department of Business, Innovation and
Skills). In our context the most significant development was the events
following the Hampton Report (2005).59 Its proposals aimed to make
regulation more “efficient” by reducing the “regulatory burden” on
companies and by making sanctions effective. The Hampton inquiry
was the initiative of HM Treasury (rather than the Home Office), and
so its proposals prioritised efficiency over effectiveness.60 The follow-up
Macrory Report (2008) argued that regulation should be transparent,
targeted, effective and proportionate, that a wider range of non-court
sanctions should be created, and that agencies should be prepared to
take strong deterrent action when less coercive sanctions do not work
(thus leaving prosecution as a last resort).61 This is entirely consistent
with the compliance approach we have seen is characteristic of regu-
latory agencies. It was, however, taken to extremes by the Regulators’
Compliance Code (RCC),62 which states that: “Regulators should re-
cognise that a key element of their activity will be to allow, or even
encourage, economic progress and only to intervene when there is a
clear case for protection.”63 The “benefits” must justify the “costs”.
Prosecutions, unlike in the Macrory Report, are not mentioned once.
This approach inevitably requires administrators and enforcement of-
ficials, rather than lawyers, to control the whole enforcement process,
including whether or not to prosecute.
For our purposes, the most significant outcome of all this was the
Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 (RESA 2008). Part 3
of RESA creates a set of “administrative sanctions” that a range of
enforcement bodies will be able to impose. These agencies include the
HSE, FSA and so forth. Sanctions include monetary penalties (fixed
and variable), enforcement undertakings, and cessation, compliance
and restoration notices. Again, some agencies already use some of these
sanctions (e.g. we have seen that the FSA can impose monetary pen-
alties; and the HSE makes considerable use of enforcement notices).
Perhaps providing a wide range of bodies with the ability to impose
monetary penalties will be the most innovative and punishment-like
59 P. Hampton, Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement (HM
Treasury 2005).
60 D. Whyte, “Gordon Brown’s charter for corporate criminals” (2007/8) 70 Criminal Justice
Matters 31; Tombs and Whyte, note 3 above.
61 R. Macrory, Regulatory Justice: Sanctioning in a post-Hampton world, Consultation Document
(Cabinet Office 2008).
62 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, Statutory Code of Practice for Regulators (2007).
63 Ibid., para. 3
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sanctions introduced by RESA. However, it is too early to tell,
as agencies will only be authorised to use these powers if they can
demonstrate that they will conform to the principles set out in the
Code.64 The idea of administrative financial penalties is a return to the
19th century idea, mentioned above, that health and safety agencies
should have punitive powers. However, even monetary penalties had
been previously provided to some agencies, as we shall see in the next
section.
IV. ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Against this background of contrasting approaches, and an incomplete
and inconclusive debate on the respective merits of separation and in-
tegration respectively, we now come to explore economic considera-
tions. We start by looking at the different costs and benefits of
integration. We then discuss the extent to which the net balance be-
tween the costs and benefits of integration is different for “regulation”
than for mainstream criminal justice.
We consider the costs and benefits of integration of investigation
and prosecution which seems to be the most relevant dimension in the
context of regulation vis-a`-vis mainstream criminal justice. In some
specific situations, we also consider the possibility of integrating ad-
judication or the determination of liability. It will be noted in the dis-
cussion when we are considering the three stages within one agency.
An economic theory that attempts to explain, or at least shed light
on, integration and the contrasting approach taken to it in the main-
stream criminal justice and regulatory enforcement contexts involves
identifying the nature of the costs and benefits of integration versus
separation. For sake of exposition, our discussion focuses on the du-
ality of integration and separation, though we realize that in most
systems there is a continuum of arrangements ranging from full sep-
aration to full integration that include intermediate arrangements
such as coordination with different degrees of control.65 The second
step is to speculate, on the basis of this analysis, whether the benefits of
integration outweigh the costs for regulatory crimes but not for
“mainstream” crimes.
64 C. Abbot, “The Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008” (2009) 11 Environmental Law
Review 38.
65 T. Krone, “The Limits of Prosecution Authority” (Australian Law Reform Commission) (2003)
(http://www.aic.gov.au/conferences/other/krone_tony/2003-11-regnet.html) identifies six different
possibilities. Our dual model is about integration (types 1, 5 and 6 in his notation) and separation
(types 2 to 4 in his notation, where the different control exercised by the prosecutor is a palliative
to the shortcomings we have identified). See also F. Guerrieri, “Law and Order: Redefining the
Relationship between Prosecutor and Police” (2001) 25 Southern Illinois University Law Journal
353 (arguing for empowerment of prosecutors to supervise police behaviour and ensure proper
standards of disclosure, that is, for further integration in our model).
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A good starting point is the economic theory of vertical integration
that provides useful insights from industrial organisation.66 It explains
why different stages of the production and distribution of a particular
good and service should be integrated in the same firm. Traditionally,
economists disliked vertical integration because it increased market
power, therefore potentially monopolizing two markets at the same
time (upstream and downstream). Later, with the development of
transaction cost theory, economists recognized that a significant
benefit from integration is the reduction of transaction costs.67
A. Benefits of Integration
1. Reduction of transaction costs
Successful law enforcement, in economic terms, requires the benefits of
enforcement to exceed the costs (an approach incorporated, as we saw
earlier, in RESA 2008). Good decision-making regarding prosecution
plays a key role in law enforcement and successful prosecution is de-
termined, among other things, by the nature of investigation and fact
discovery. Hence coordination between all these stages helps to achieve
successful law enforcement. Integration improves coordination, there-
fore saving resources or reducing the likelihood of inappropriate con-
demnations and sanctions given the quality of investigation and
prosecution. The costs borne by the system to achieve such coordi-
nation are called in economics transaction costs. These transaction
costs are reduced by integration.
Obviously these transaction costs are zero when the same person
investigates and prosecutes (full integration raises other problems that
will be considered in the subsection on costs of integration). However,
due to cognitive limitations, full integration might not be always fea-
sible, therefore relying on other solutions may be necessary (teams with
leaders, hierarchies with delegation, specialized agencies, etc).
One very relevant example concerns distortions from multiple tasks
that cannot be objectively assessed. A single agency internalizes this
problem by effectively centralizing decision-making, and hence it could
reduce complexity and uncertainty. In other words, investigation and
prosecution could be actually easier to understand and more predict-
able when they are not clouded by conflicting goals or when allocating
responsibility is easier and less diffuse (in a single agency rather than
66 The economic literature on vertical integration goes back to the 1930s, but the main foundations
of the current theory were established in the late 1970s and early 1980s. For a comprehensive
survey and critical discussion of the literature, see F. Lafontaine and M. Slade, “Vertical
Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence” (2007) 45 Journal of Economic Literature
629–685.
67 On the empirical literature about transaction cost theory, see also Lafontaine and Slade, note 66
above.
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apportioned across different agencies). Consistency in investigation
and prosecution within the limited range of cases taken by an in-
tegrated agency is easier to achieve than if dispersed among several
agencies.
A second aspect to be considered is the reduction of transaction costs
caused by conflicts over residual property rights (for example, between
the police or any other agency that conducts investigation and the
prosecutors).68 A single agency gets all the residual property rights over
the payoff from achieving success in sentencing as well as over the
losses from failing to accomplish the socially perceived goals, hence
reducing transaction costs caused by disputes over who gets praised or
criticized for the achievements.
2. Specialisation
Since transaction costs are reduced and coordination is improved
within a single agency, specific investment in highly specialized assets
is facilitated. In fact, the conventional problem with specific investment
is that, without appropriate coordination, the return could be lost or
expropriated by other agents (the so-called hold-up problem, that is,
due to the possibility of expropriation, specific investment is reduced
therefore hurting the underlying productive activity). In the context of
a single enforcement agency, the hold-up problem is less likely and
investment in specific assets is more secure.
Specific investment in the enforcement context could be seen at dif-
ferent levels: (i) specialisation in field of law (such as competition or tax
law), (ii) specialisation in specific industries or sectors (such as tele-
communications or banking), (iii) specialisation in process techniques
or in tasks, (iv) specialisation in the nature of enforcement (for ex-
ample, either in advice regarding compliance or in taking a “hard line”
approach to prosecution).
Whatever the level or type of specialisation one can have in mind, the
relevant problem is that the added value of pursuing such strategy
could be lost when afterwards the output (either in terms of fact dis-
covery or in prosecution) has to be delivered to an agency or a court
that does not enjoy the same level of specialisation, does not share the
same knowledge or does not have the same ability to appreciate the
work done. Integration reduces this possibility. Clearly such advantage
68 See, for example, D. Richman, “Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors”
(2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 750–832 and R. Barkow, “Institutional Design and the Policing
of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law” (2009) Stanford Law Review 61. Krone, note
65 above identifies the costs of having the prosecution relying on the information solely gathered
and provided by the police as a major disadvantage of separation (the Prosecutor Fiscal’s Office in
Scotland is the example provided and discussed in his article). However, the same was true of the
pre-CPS model in England andWales. The SFO is an example of an integrated approach that does
not suffer from these problems.
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is more relevant when the object of the investigation, prosecution and
sentencing requires highly technical intellectual capacity or a very
particular framework appropriately tailored for the case. In other
words, the more investment in specificity is required by investigation
and prosecution, the more persuasive is the argument for integration.
Another important consequence of the reduction of the costs im-
posed by potential hold-ups is the ability for a single agency to explore
economies of scale that can allow expansion of core competences. In
other words, the resources saved by appropriate and valuable special-
isation can be used to develop new and innovative approaches as well
as enhance the ability of the single agency for further action. On one
hand, this could support a more effective agency. On the other hand, it
could create jurisdiction problems by empowering the agency to act
outside of the core competences.69
3. Fast track intervention
A third advantage of integration is the ability to develop fast track
approaches, that is to reduce the procedures required for processing
individual cases. One possibility is the mitigation of procedural
formalism between the different stages of the process (investigation,
discovery, prosecution and sentencing) when this can take place within
a common framework managed by a single individual or a single
agency.70 Another likely consequence is that intervention can be oper-
ated at earlier stages, or at least, presumably it is easier to intervene
ex ante facto, precisely because formalism is mitigated and decisions
can be taken quicker and faster.
Faster interventions have benefits and costs. The benefits include the
ability to intervene ex ante facto, hence reducing the likelihood of
production of harm71, and to provide a speedier solution, presumably
minimizing the disruption of investigation and prosecution. The costs
are essentially derived from the implementation of rushed decisions
that effectively apply a lower standard of proof, and hence might result
in errors. In an ideal world, formalism is designed to respond optimally
to this trade-off. Fast track could be the optimal response for a subset
of cases whereas more formalism would be the optimal response to
most cases in mainstream criminal law. In the real world, excessive
69 For example, the jurisdictional conflicts between industry-specific regulatory agencies and
antitrust authorities can be understood from this perspective. See P. Barros and S. Hoernig,
“Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best” (2004) CEPR
Working-Paper 4541.
70 We are considering the extreme case here. For intermediate arrangements, the benefits and
problems detected with fast track interventions are mitigated.
71 In terms of harmful consequences, it is obvious that certain regulatory crimes can have much more
harmful effects than certain kinds of pretty crime. Nevertheless, there is a general perception that
crime, on average, is more harmful than regulatory offences.
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formalism might be a consequence of bureaucratic interests and rents
derived by the legal professions. In this scenario, fast track interven-
tions are potentially more beneficial.
This does not mean that a separated agency cannot develop
fast track approaches. For example, the police through warning and
restorative justice processes can obviously develop different tracks, and
assign many cases to be the object of quick and limited interventions.
However, fast track interventions are necessarily bounded by some
institutional arrangements that are imposed on enforcement agencies.
If prosecution has to take place in court, and the court imposes the
sanction, fast tracking is very limited by nature. If on top of that, the
separated agency has a limited influence in the sequence of investi-
gation, prosecution and sentencing, that further limits the ability to
engage in fast tracking.
4. “Monopoly power”
Some form of bargaining between the investigator or prosecutor and
the defendant plays an increasingly important role in relation both
to crime (plea-bargaining) and regulation (negotiating compliance).
A single agency supervising or operating in all stages of the
process increases “monopoly power” when bargaining with a defend-
ant. Clearly individual officials within a single agency are in a much
better position to engage in this phenomenon since they do not have to
negotiate or coordinate their policies with equivalents in other agen-
cies. Therefore the decisions taken by the single agency are enhanced by
the strong bargaining power they have. By comparison, in a multiple
agency situation, diversion solutions such as plea-bargaining can be
undermined by the lack of ability of credible commitment by the
prosecutor or by potential squabbling between prosecutor, police and
judge.72
B. Costs of Integration
1. Error costs
Two individuals or institutions making or reviewing decisions are likely
to make fewer errors than when the decision is made by a single indi-
vidual or institutions. Errors in enforcement policy are therefore likely
to increase with integration and these include both type I errors (that is,
defendants are inappropriately prosecuted) and type II errors (that
72 Since plea-bargaining is prevalent without “monopoly power” the latter is clearly not a necessary
condition, but one that simply enhances diversionary power. See, further, N. Garoupa and
F. Stephen, “Why Plea-Bargaining Fails to Achieve Results in So Many Criminal Justice Systems:
A New Framework for Assessment” (2008) 15 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative
Law 319.
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is, defendants inappropriately escape prosecution).73 The impact is
different though depending on the costs of these errors. In the regu-
latory context, these costs are substantially different and pre-
dominantly lower than in the context of criminal law.74 Since criminal
prosecution and conviction generate a significant cost in terms of sti-
gma and reputation, the cost of type I error is considerably higher in
mainstream criminal law (to the point of being the focus of criminal
procedure designed to minimize such cost by virtue of imposing a high
burden of proof).75 For serious crimes, the costs of type II errors are
also very significant both in terms of reduced general deterrence (hence
more crime in the future) and reduced incapacitation (the same indi-
vidual is likely to undercomply more frequently). Hence error costs due
to integration can vary across different areas of enforcement activity.
One source of enforcement error is capture.76 Due to the repeated
game nature of the actions taken by an integrated single agency and the
weakness of external controls (when there are several agencies, each is
subject to a degree of external accountability to the others), the possi-
bility of capture by defendants is higher. The costs of capture can have
repercussions in all stages, by contaminating the investigation and fact
discovery and by distorting prosecution. The consequence of capture
may be type I errors (individuals or firms are overly or unjustly pun-
ished due to pressure of competitors or other vested interests) or type II
errors (individuals or firms are acquitted or punished too softly).77 In
both cases it seriously undermines successful enforcement policy.
Obviously, separation of agencies does not fully resolve the problem,
since monitoring across agencies is not perfect and, for example, non-
prosecuted cases are not seen by “higher” agencies.
Another source of enforcement error is behaviour biases in the sense
that decision making within given agencies tends to favour either a
more strenuous approach, leading to type I errors, or else to a more
lenient approach, leading to type II errors. Behavioural biases are more
likely when a single agency integrates all stages since there is no system
of balance and checks, that is, external accountability is weaker. One
important example is the possibility of significant hindsight bias, that
73 Although potentially related, we should make a clear distinction between errors in prosecution (as
mentioned explicitly in the text) and errors in adjudication (defendants inappropriately convicted
and defendants inappropriately acquitted).
74 Notwithstanding that the costs of errors in terms of damage to human health and property
resulting from regulating civil use of, for example, nuclear energy may be very high.
75 Regulatory action consisting of inappropriately issuing notices to stop an industrial process under
environmental legislation can generate significant type I error costs.
76 Capture refers to situations where an agency created to pursue public interest goals acts in favor of
private interests or adopts the agenda of special interests. Corruption is an extreme example of
capture. For a broad discussion, see K.N. Hylton and V. Khanna, “A Public Choice Theory of
Criminal Procedure” (2007) 15 Supreme Court Economic Review 61.
77 These consequences are aggravated if adjudication is also controlled by the integrated agency.
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is, an assessment bias due to the natural inclination to avoid discussion
about the merits of the investigation.
There are two ways behavioural biases matter. First, by distorting
decisions within the agency, since the evaluation of evidence, the
assessment of facts or the consideration of appropriate prosecution is
no longer as objective as it should be. For example, the single agency
might make serious mistakes because it is unable to impartially or dis-
passionately assess the merits of each case. A costly investigation or a
cumbersome fact discovery might lead to prosecution for the simple
reason that the agency is unable to accept that such costs are sunk and
the decision to follow should be based on the merits, not on the re-
sources already spent. There is a second way behavioural biases matter.
Once the single agency realises that some decisions were wrongly driven
by internal biases rather than objective assessment of merits, there
could be a tendency for covering-up rather than exposing flaws. This is
quite likely when the reputation of the agency is at stake and re-
sponsibility cannot be shifted away.
2. Weak accountability
Weak accountability fosters capture.78 Single agencies are less ac-
countable because interaction between agencies is missing. Capture can
be external and internal to the single agency.
With respect to external capture, one should consider the costs in
terms of valuable resources socially wasted by attempts to capture the
decision-maker (and the costs of capturing more than one agency are
higher than those of capturing a single agency).79 As we know from the
economic literature on regulation, there are possible palliatives to
undercut the possibility of capture. However, in that case, one should
add the costs of deterring and punishing capture. These costs can be
substantial in the contexts of very specific knowledge or when stakes
are very large.
Another version of capture is the creation of rents by the single
agency, that is, rather than external capture, we can observe internal
capture. In this example, the problem is not undermining appropriate
sentencing due to external pressure, but manipulating the investigation
and prosecution to achieve internal goals of appropriating more re-
sources (larger budget, higher salaries for the enforcers, more fringe
benefits, even ideological goals). Since external accountability is
78 On the economic literature on accountability within the principal-agent model, see D.E.M.
Sappington, “Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships” (1991) 5 Journal of Economic
Perspectives 45–66.
79 This known by economists as “rent-seeking activity”: unproductive activities for which an
economic rent is sought, that is, an income or profitability above (perfectly competitive) market
equilibrium.
C.L.J. The Investigation and Prosecution of Regulatory Offences 249
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 09 Jul 2014 IP address: 147.188.224.215
weaker when all stages of the process are integrated, the risk of such
rent-seeking emerging and eventually prevailing is higher. Again,
measures can be taken to reduce this possibility or overcome the
problem, but they are costly.
Weak accountability also generates other costs. Due to the fact that
external controls are weak and results cannot be easily assessed since
specific knowledge is required to understand the actions and decisions
of a single agency, excessive capacity financed by the taxpayer becomes
a serious concern. There might be a temptation to develop oversized
bureaucracies, consuming too many resources and imposing a heavy
burden on the Government’s budget. An important consequence, as we
have seen, could be the manipulation of investigation and prosecution
to justify excessive resources consumed by the bureaucracy.
One possibility of mitigating weak accountability within a single
agency is to introduce external inspections. Inspections can investigate
application of rules and policies, effectiveness, value for money, etc and
therefore detect capture or mitigate problems generated by integration.
Presumably external inspections are more valuable when the costs of
weak accountability are higher and when investigation and prosecution
are performed by a single agency. Therefore, given a certain standard
for accountability one would think that where there are separate
agencies there would be less need for inspectorates than where there is
an integrated agency. To a certain extent, separate agencies reduce the
need for an inspectorate, but we discuss later how far this approach is
actually adopted in England and Wales.
3. Behavioural effects
Depending on how a single agency is structured and organized, having
regard in particular to internal mechanisms of control, integration
might exacerbatemoral hazard (usually shirking, but any kind of hidden
or unverifiable action that reduces productivity) and adverse selection
problems (due to some hidden or unverifiable set of attributes, inves-
tigation and prosecution attract less productive individuals).80
It is true that diffuse responsibility and lack of coordination between
agencies, when it is difficult to apportion responsibility for failures or
mistakes across all the agencies involved, is likely to induce shirking or
free-riding behaviour. However, in an integrated agency, team pro-
duction without an appropriate incentive structure could also create
moral hazard. The balance depends very much on the relative merits of
internal and external mechanisms of control. For a single agency, we
80 See, among others, the canonical articles by B. Holmstro¨m, “Moral Hazard and Observability”
(1979) 10 Bell Journal of Economics 74–91 and S. Shavell, “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the
Principal Agent Relationship” (1979) 10 Bell Journal of Economics 55–73.
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need an internal mechanism of control since external accountability is
weaker. A single agency with an adequate hierarchy and an internally
accountable team leadership should be able to reduce the problems.
However, an oversized bureaucracy, with the risk that it will be
unmotivated and dysfunctional, could well exacerbate them. The de-
sign of the agency will be crucial in addressing these problems, as is
evident from our earlier discussion of the HMRC and FSA. There is no
reason to think that motivated regulatory agencies and unmotivated
police forces is an inevitable outcome. Within each structure (separated
or integrated), moral hazard issues can be addressed by developing
appropriate strategies. 81
A similar trade-off applies to adverse selection. A single specialised
agency can motivate and attract high human capital in a specific area.
At the same time it can attract individuals who are not intrinsically
motivated to investigate or prosecute. It could also attract more risk-
averse individuals who prefer weaker external accountability and safer
enforcement strategies that an integrated framework would foster. The
balance between these two opposite effects will govern the set of in-
centives within a single agency. The rules and standards applied, for
example, in the recruitment of human capital will inevitably influence
the magnitude of an adverse selection effect.
These behavioural effects are relevant since they partially influence
errors and miscarriages of justice, and thus can increase error costs.
The costs of moral hazard and adverse selection are measured in terms
of how much appropriate investigation and prosecution is undermined.
As emphasised, they are not distinctive of an integrated structure, but
rather can be augmented or reduced depending on the appropriate in-
centives within the agency.
The fact that external accountability is weaker when an agency is
integrated certainly amplifies the consequences of moral hazard and
adverse selection. Nonetheless, an appropriate institutional design of
instruments to address motivation and a more significant emphasis on
recruiting high human capital could minimize their impact.
C. The Balance of Costs and Benefits of Integration
In economic terms, the case for integration thus turns on the optimal
responses to the several trade-offs we have identified. For example, the
cost of coordination between investigation and prosecution efforts
might be higher in relation to crimes that are difficult to investigate and
81 For example, by considering the extensive literature on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. See
R. Be´nabou and J, Tirole, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation” (2003) 70 Review of Economic
Studies 489–520.
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prosecute, thus justifying the emergence of a single agency, as with the
SFO discussed earlier.82
Krone (2003) has suggested that integrated arrangements are more
correlated with private intervention and have become more fashion-
able. Our approach can explain that observation. Integrated arrange-
ments are easily tailored to specific industries or violations. It could
also be a sign of rent-seeking by potential victims and potential viola-
tors of the law as we have explained before. Finally, the complexity of
many areas of economic activity requires simplified procedure and
faster decisions.
V. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK TO CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND REGULATORY PROCESSES
Here we apply the economic framework developed in the last section
to the institutions and settings of mainstream criminal justice and
regulatory enforcement respectively, to ascertain whether, and to what
extent, there are significant differences between them, thus justifying
the contrasting approach taken to the prosecution process. We also
relate the analysis to the non-economic arguments outlined in sections
II and III.
A. Benefits of Integration
1. Reduction of transaction costs
The principal idea, that coordination across multiple tasks reduces
transactions costs and that this might imply integration of two
organisations where the tasks are sufficiently related, on the face of it
applies to both mainstream crime and regulation, since investigation
and prosecution are related. It reflects also the non-economic goal
of consistency highlighted in the report of the Royal Commission on
Criminal Procedure.
The fact that regulatory agencies are generally smaller, and have a
much narrower jurisdictional scope than the police might suggest that
inconsistency of decision-making is in that context less of a problem,
and that therefore the benefits of integration would not be that large.
However, these considerations may be outweighed by two others. First,
there is often a significant technical content to regulatory offences,
implying that information costs and error costs are lower if a single
82 Following Krone, note 65 above, other examples include the Special Prosecutor’s Office in the
USA as a body of investigation and prosecution for independent pursuit of complaints against
high office holders; the reform of the South African National DPP’s Office for organized crime, or
white collar crimes involving complex accounting transactions in Australia.
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agency is involved. Secondly, as both the theoretical83 and empirical
literature84 reveal, in most regulatory sectors prosecution is very much a
last resort, with the enforcement agencies relying on other, less costly,
means of enforcement in the great majority of cases. Given such an
approach, which is not true for mainstream crime, it can be argued that
the agency responsible for prosecuting the small percentage of cases
selected for this process should be very familiar with the processes used
for the large majority of those contravening, a condition less costly to
achieve if the same agency is used for both processes.
Inconsistency of decision-making by the police might suggest the
merits of a single agency, but existing problems in England and Wales
are perhaps more the consequence of the fact that we do not have a
national police force. Therefore reorganisation of the police might have
a greater impact on inconsistency than integration of investigation and
prosecution.
The second idea, that transaction costs arise from conflicts in the
rights to payoffs and that integration would reduce such costs, might
have a limited application in England and Wales in comparison with
some other countries. To the extent that payoffs do exist, they might
nevertheless assume greater importance for regulatory enforcement
agencies, than for the police, because the reputation of the police covers
a very much broader range of offences than a sectoral regulatory
agency and therefore success with prosecution might have a higher
profile for the latter.
2. Specialisation
The rules enforced by regulatory agencies tend to be more specific,
more complex and, as we have seen, more technical, than those appli-
cable to mainstream crime, thus suggesting greater benefits from inte-
gration in that context. Of course, the very generality of most principles
of criminal law necessarily involves discretion by prosecutors, thus
creating obstacles to consistency, as discussed above. On the other
hand, this might be balanced by another observed feature that dis-
cretion as to whether or not to prosecute seems to play a much greater
role in the regulatory sector. More generally, the scale of economies
argument would seem to have a greater degree of justification for the
regulatory sphere, compared to mainstream crime, because the greater
diversity and generality of criminal justice issues would require a very
large organisation for the scale economies to be achievable.
83 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate
(Oxford 1992).
84 Hawkins (2002), note 47 above; Abbot (2009), note 49 above.
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The gains in specialisation are usually perceived as significant in the
regulatory context. For example, the recent internal reforms developed
by the FSA, as we have discussed before, were designed precisely to
solve enforcement deficiencies without diminishing specialisation. The
same is true of the SFO, though this should be understood not as a
regulatory body but as a highly specialised policing body for one
complex type of crime.
3. Fast track intervention
One generalisation on fast track intervention is easy to make: the
benefits are large in relation to unlawful acts which generate large
social costs and which can be prevented or deterred by an early inter-
vention. It is difficult to make comparisons between regulation and
crime on this basis alone because both cover a wide spectrum between,
at one extreme, relatively trivial offences and, at the other, very serious
offences. Nevertheless, activities which give rise to regulatory contra-
ventions are often continuous and in that respect susceptible to pre-
ventative intervention, or repeated, in which case the intervention can
have a deterrent effect. While many criminal offences are repeated,
continuous crimes are much less frequent than continuous regulatory
contraventions. In this respect, therefore, and subject to the question of
the amount of harm caused, the benefits of early intervention are likely
to be greater in the regulatory sphere.
We can also assume that because of the stigma attaching to main-
stream criminal convictions, the error costs arising from a wrongful
conviction are likely to be higher than those consequent on a wrongful
regulatory condemnation.85 If that is right, then the costs of fast track
intervention are likely to be greater for criminal justice than for regu-
lation, because the earlier the intervention, the greater the likelihood of
an erroneous decision.
4. “Monopoly power”
Our economic analysis indicates the important benefits which can
arise from a single agency bargaining with a defendant. Although plea
bargaining plays an increasingly important role in the criminal justice
system, it features even more prominently in regulatory enforcement86
and with the growing phenomenon of co-regulation involving
some form of collaboration in rule-making and enforcement between
85 When a criminal conviction results from a regulatory offence, the stigma might apply equally.
However, regulatory crimes are viewed by many (e.g. Lamond, note 3 above) as not “real” crimes.
While we do not necessarily subscribe to this view, the fact that it is held by many affects the
stigma attaching. Further, our argument also concerns the penalties imposed by regulatory
enforcement that are “administrative”, and not criminal in nature.
86 J. Black, “Talking About Regulation” (1998) Public Law 77–105.
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regulators and regulatees,87 that latter characteristic is becoming even
more significant.
It should be noticed too that the agency costs of a negotiated
solution are likely to be higher in relation to mainstream crime where
defendants are typically poor, as compared with the regulatory
contraventions where defendants are often firms or relatively wealthy
individuals.88
B. Costs of Integration
1. Error costs
Whether the level of competence exercised in the process would be
higher or lower with an integration of the investigatory and prosecut-
ing functions has featured in policy discussions of the issue. As we have
seen, consistency and competence have featured in the non-economic
arguments for separation. The consequences of (relative) incom-
petence, mistakes in the prosecution process, are dealt with in our
economic framework. We there indicate why in general error costs of
both type I (inappropriate prosecutions) and type II (inappropriate
non-prosecutions) are likely to be higher in relation to mainstream
crime, in particular serious crime, than for most regulatory enforce-
ment. The non-integration of investigation and prosecution can serve
as a constraint on such costs.
Integrated agencies, such as the police, may in principle be
“captured” by lawbreakers, leading to type II errors, and indeed some
police units sometimes are.89 But since regulatory agencies deal princi-
pally with corporate defendants and representatives of industry, they
are, as the literature indicates90 for that reason typically more vulner-
able to capture than the police. For example, the “revolving doors”
phenomenon – regulators hired by the regulated industry – has been
discussed and widely documented in the context of regulatory agencies,
though less so for police and prosecutors.91 The empirical evidence
also suggests that errors arising from behavioural biases in the en-
forcement personnel or agency policies are also more likely to arise in
the regulatory context, most observed agencies perceiving it to be their
87 N. Gunningham and P. Grabosky, Smart Regulation (Clarendon 1998); R. Baldwin and J. Black,
“Really Responsive Regulation” (2008) 71 M.L.R. 59.
88 For a detailed economic analysis, see Garoupa and Stephen, note 72 above.
89 The main problem here is “undercover” policing where the police by definition integrate, to some
extent, with the policed. See Sanders, Young and Burton, ch. 6, note 17 above.
90 P.J. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (Princeton 1981); G. Slapper and
S. Tombs, Corporate Crime (London 1999).
91 M. Maggetti, “De facto Independence after Delegation: A Fuzzy-set Analysis” (2007) 1
Regulation and Governance 271–294. But see Garoupa and Stephen, note 72 above discussing
the problems posed by prosecution of wealthy defendants.
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responsibility to achieve compliance through persuasion and advice
rather than the imposition of penalties.92
These error costs were at the heart of the Strachan report on the
FSA.93 Its recommendations suggested mechanisms to reduce the
possibility of enforcement mistakes while keeping the advantages of a
specialised regulatory agency. They try to secure checks and balances
across investigation, prosecution and the determination of liability in-
side the FSA. Thus these functions were kept in the one single agency,
but were separated in order to avoid excessive error costs.
2. Weak accountability
Although the plurality of police forces in England and Wales necess-
arily constitutes an obstacle to accountability, the legal and the politi-
cal mechanisms of police accountability are stronger than in relation to
regulatory agencies. Many examples could be given. Each police force
is accountable to a Police Authority, made up in part of local council-
lors; and individual police forces, as well as the service as a whole, are
scrutinized by the Inspectorate of Constabulary. Arguably the CPS is
another body to whom the police are accountable, insofar as a large
proportion of police decisions are scrutinized by CPS and the material
collected by police forms the basis of CPS prosecutions. And to the
extent that a relatively high proportion of police enforcement decisions
result in prosecutions that are scrutinised by the courts, there is some
accountability to the courts.
In part, this all arises from the higher public profile of the police,
relative to that of other agencies, but there are also more important
reasons. It has never been easy to place regulatory agencies within
the traditional accountability framework of English public law, based
primarily on the Diceyan obsession with judicial review: since a very
small proportion of agency enforcement decisions result in prosecu-
tions, there is very little accountability to the courts. Nor are there
Inspectorates or CPS- and Police Authority-equivalents looking over
the shoulders of most such agencies.94 Other accountability structures,
for example the Ombudsman and the public audit institutions, have
emerged in a fragmented and piecemeal fashion. It has been argued
that the very diversity of the arrangements can in aggregate exercise
powerful constraints on the agencies,95 but it is more likely that the
incoherence of the arrangements tends to dilute their impact.96
92 Abbot, note 49 above.
93 FSA, note 51 above.
94 Sanders, Young and Burton, note 17 above ch. 7.
95 C. Scott, “Accountability in the Regulatory State” (2000) 22 Journal of Law and Society 38–60.
96 C. Graham, “Is There a Crisis in Regulatory Accountability?” (1995) Discussion paper 13, Centre
for Regulated Industries.
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An interesting aspect of accountability relates to the role of third
parties. In the criminal justice context, increasing attention is being
given to victims of crime. The focus of attention is both in relation to
restorative justice and more orthodox prosecution decisions. Thus
there is now a Code of Practice for Victims of Crime which creates
obligations for the police (and other criminal justice agencies) in
relation to victims, and court challenges from victims to the police are
increasing. This undoubtedly creates pressure on the police in the way
they exercise their law enforcement functions. In the regulatory sphere,
there is not the same attention to victims. It is true that third parties
may play a significant role in monitoring both to detect contraventions
and to oversee the enforcement efforts of regulatory agencies, but in
some sectors they are deprived of the right themselves to undertake the
enforcement processes97 and regulatory agencies have no obligations
under the Victims Code.98
3. Behavioural effects
General comparisons between police and regulatory agencies regarding
behavioural effects are not easy to make. It may be that since regulat-
ory agencies are typically more specialised they can attract more skilled
and knowledgeable officials than the police. Although that might re-
duce the moral hazard and adverse selection problems, it exacerbates
the “revolving doors” phenomenon. This has very little counterpart in
the police force, and predictably can reduce the motivation to enforce
conscientiously. Further, the range of values and motivations held
by regulatory enforcement officials is almost certainly more diverse
than that held by police officers, where the “law and order” goal pre-
dominates. Important behavioural effects have been detected in the
FSA, as we have seen before. The recent changes in the internal or-
ganisation of the FSA aim to promote better mechanisms to reduce
moral hazard, minimize adverse selection, and therefore enhance suc-
cessful enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed an economic framework to explore the extent to
which investigation and prosecution should be separated, and which
can inform scholarly debate and legal policymaking in general. The
economic argument is that different types of crime and the behaviours
that give rise to them impact differentially on society; thus enforcement
97 A. Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford 2004), pp. 86–87.
98 Sanders, Young and Burton, note 17 above, ch. 13; D. Whyte, “Victims of Corporate Crime” in
S. Walklate (ed.), Handbook of Victims and Victimology (Cullompton 2007).
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policy and practice (broadly defined) should vary from one type of
crime or offence to another.
We have identified the relevant benefits and costs that should be
considered when designing investigation and prosecution processes and
structures. As regards benefits, we have focused on the reduction of
transaction costs, the gains from specialisation, the possibility of
fast track interventions, and the advantages of “monopoly power” in
the context of negotiated compliance. With respect to costs, we have
discussed error costs, the consequences of weak accountability, and the
problems posed by behavioural effects.
Just as the economic approach yields useful insights into enforce-
ment policy,99 it can do the same in relation to the design of investi-
gation and prosecution processes and structures.100 Our framework
could easily explain why it is possible and consistent to promote
separation of investigation and prosecution in the criminal justice
system and yet favour integration in regulatory law. However, the
example of the SFO indicates that this conclusion should be refined
a little more. It is not so much that separation is most appropriate
for traditional criminal justice, and integration for regulatory justice,
as that separation is most appropriate for relatively straightforward
crime, and integration for more complex matters.
Our discussion has identified several other matters for further con-
sideration. The problems we document in relation to HMRC and the
FSA arise in part from their integrated nature – or, at least, from the
ways in which integration was operationalised. Different kinds of sol-
ution were put in place (including, for HMRC, the “separated” model),
yet the integrated solution adopted for the SFO – with lawyers taking
the lead – was not adopted. It may be that over time this will be seen to
be a mistake. These examples also show that the accountability prob-
lems we identify in integrated models have not been addressed in public
policy discussions. It is a paradox that there are several (admittedly
flawed) mechanisms of accountability in relation to the police, but
virtually none in relation to other agencies.
Our framework is important for the application of the recently en-
acted Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act (RESA) 2008. This
will significantly enlarge the enforcement powers of many regulatory
agencies when it is implemented. In particular, it will enable agencies to
impose administrative financial penalties for contraventions without
resort to the criminal justice process. This is a further shift away from
the separation model adopted for “mainstream” crime, and it re-
inforces the integrative approach taken in regulatory law. It is not clear
99 Abbot, note 49 above.
100 See Barkow, note 68 above, for a discussion about the appropriate design of policing and
prosecution activities in the United States.
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that the thinking underlying RESA 2008 addresses the costs and
benefits of this expanded integrated approach. Our model identifies the
costs imposed by integration. We discuss possible palliatives to reduce
these costs, and therefore promote the additional benefits from inte-
gration. The implementation of RESA 2008 should pay close attention
to these important palliatives, in particular the institutional design
of regulatory agencies and the development of significant external
accountability. As we have seen, RESA 2008 creates a potentially
powerful set of administrative sanctions similar to many of those
already possessed by the FSA. It will be important to ensure that in all
agencies the process leading up to the determination of violations, and
the imposition of sanctions following such a finding, does not have the
same flaws that existed in the FSA.
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